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Critical Solace 
David James 
 
 
 
Can style compensate for plot? Cormac McCarthy certainly thinks so. It probably 
seems counterintuitive, if not downright wrong-headed, to seek consolation in The 
Road (2006). Undeterred, I want to make this bleakest of post-apocalyptic novels my 
first brief port of call. As readers will remember, a man and his son are on the move; 
they have been for months. Now, though, they are fast running out of food. Having 
observed but so far managed to escape the horrors of cannibalism, they know it’s 
going to be harder to stave off starvation. Across a devastated North American terrain 
they trudge south toward the promise of warmer weather – also toward the sea. In 
heading for the coast, the man knows that “he was placing hopes where he’d no 
reason to,” wishing only the ocean “would be brighter where for all he knew the 
world grew darker daily.”1 Progress to the shore is slow, and they endure “[l]ong 
days” through “[o]pen country with the ash blowing over the road” (R 181). But 
something in the air suddenly changes and the man notices “open country to the east”: 
 
Then they came upon it from a turn in the road and they stopped and stood 
with the salt wind blowing in their hair where they’d lowered the hoods of 
their coats to listen. Out there was the gray beach with the slow combers 
rolling dull and leaden and the distant sound of it. Like the desolation of 
 2 
some alien sea breaking on the shores of a world unheard of. Out on the 
tidal flats lay a tanker half careened. Beyond that the ocean vast and cold 
and shifting heavily like a slowly heaving vat of slag and then the gray 
squall line of ash. He looked at the boy. He could see the disappointment 
in his face. I’m sorry it’s not blue, he said. That’s okay, said the boy.  (R 
181) 
 
What could be more dismaying? The longed-for prospect of the sea as a vestige of 
ecological endurance, as a zone that’s “brighter” than the land’s monochrome 
charcoal, as proof that those “aching blue” “siren worlds” the man has been “learning 
how to wake himself from” do still exist (R 15), proving too that their slog has been 
worth it – all this is dashed over the course of one onomatopoeic description of 
despair. The dental diction simulates in its listless rhythm the predictability of what 
they see, as “dull and leaden” waves lumber onto a beach that’s coupled with the 
novel’s most frequent yet muted epithet: gray. Both grammar and lexis reinforce the 
“disappointment” the boy can’t help himself from showing.  
Such is the iconic bleakness with which The Road depicts a “world shrinking 
down about a raw core of parsible entities” (R 75), leading us about as far from solace 
as one could imagine. In whatever shape or form, consolation is hardly what we 
expect to find in this realm of catastrophe, not only at the level of harrowing content 
but in expressional terms as well. In fact The Road, at first glance, “seems exhausted 
at the level of style itself,” as Andrew Hoberek has observed.2 Arranged piecemeal, 
the novel’s fractured typography visually compounds this effect of debilitation, with 
paragraphs set off from one another in spacious isolation. Moving in closer still, we 
notice that syntactically too McCarthy’s declarative phrases, shorn of commas and 
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subordination, simulate in their very texture the enervated environment they detail. 
This equivalence between syntax and scenery, between articulation and exhaustion, is 
part of what makes the book so memorably chilling. But it doesn’t necessarily mean 
that equation is consistent; to venture that indeed it isn’t means considering how 
McCarthy has other things in mind for style – for description, to be more precise – 
aside from communicating doom.  
Evidence showing how description squares up to action in this way features in 
the sentence above on “desolation.” In a striking simile, we’re invited to imagine an 
“alien sea” from some undiscovered realm. With this image the narrative perspective 
departs from the impress of the man’s misery: far from defeated, the language gathers 
metaphoric vitality and metric momentum, building through a crescendo of two 
successive anapests (“on the shores of a world”) toward the accentual amphibrach 
with which McCarthy’s portrait of this “unheard of” domain closes. Likewise, 
acoustically, the sibilance is not simply deployed in the service of the scene’s literal 
description but instead facilitates its figurative transcription. Sure, this diction 
provides an apt aural correlative to the melancholy plash of waves. Yet McCarthy’s 
alliterative cascade (some, sea, shores) propels us at the same time toward the picture 
of another world, a world whose “alien” appearance isn’t straightforwardly 
comforting, to say the least, but whose sonorous depiction counterpoints the very 
“desolation” that inspires it. Undeniably, this simile emphasizes the novel’s dismal 
setting by way of otherworldly comparison; phonetically, though, its surrounding 
sentence carries an amplified assonance that attempts to suture ecological wounds 
with acoustic grace.  
It would be reckless, of course, to make a single sentence like this 
representative of the novel at large. And furthermore, euphony is a rather selective 
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unit of analysis, making my already narrow attention to syntax here seem narrower 
still. But The Road justifies this manner of close reading a verbal soundscape that 
resonates athwart the visual landscape it accompanies. Description counteracts the 
annihilation it conjures yet never pretends to heal, an anomaly that shapes McCarthy’s 
approach to the genre of brutal demise he so arrestingly inhabits. Against the weight 
of biospheric and physiological decline, description phonically and rhythmically 
asserts itself – redressing the diminishment it evokes. However futile this appears, 
description nonetheless provides a “stylistic concomitant of the sense of potential” 
that inheres throughout the novel and in spite of the horrors that ostensibly structure 
it.3 
What McCarthy’s wretched tale suggests is that prosodic ingredients of 
description can reroute the negative affects we expect them to affirm. Refusing 
entirely to reinforce the turbulence it portrays, description jostles against the 
discomfiture a text like The Road seems bent on imparting. From this competition 
between content and form several larger, metacritical issues arise that I want to pursue 
in the following pages. Working at cross-purposes with a work’s generic gist in this 
way, might consolation be a facet of novelistic description that recasts – sometimes 
intentionally, at other times inadvertently and defiantly – the very diegetic material it 
serves to record? And if description counterpoints instead of simply classifying and 
conveying what it describes, do we need to rethink the very immanence of its mimetic 
function? Which is to say, description might not be so passive as we might assume, 
fostering disunities instead between style and scene. Far from being a rudimentary, 
taxonomical device that frames and names, I argue that description is more vivacious 
in contemporary writing than traditional theorizations of it lead us to assume. And it’s 
this vivacity that lies at the crux of how literary description consoles: rarely neutral, 
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description in recent fiction draws attention to its own aliveness, its own insurgent 
tendency to kick against plot. Fathoming the stakes of this dissidence for 
understanding the poetics of solace means not merely salvaging description as a 
neglected kingpin of writerly charisma or flair. It also invites us to ponder how 
description misbehaves, how it hatches rogue aesthetic plans, how indeed it becomes 
– through the sumptuous pressure it exerts on what it describes – a type of narration in 
its own right.  
What might fiction’s affects look like, then, once we view them as part of the 
agency of description? That is, how might a literary work console by doing something 
of its own accord, by insinuating through its compositional texture that language 
counterpoints as much as it coheres with what it conveys? To pose such questions is 
to entertain, moreover, the possibility that fiction maybe at its most consoling 
precisely when it doesn’t depend upon the reader’s consolation. The solace of 
depiction, we’ll discover, isn’t synonymous with the comforts of reading. And later 
on, this distinction will lead me to navigate between ways of reading for description 
and the varied ambitions of so-called “descriptive reading” as such. Gauging the 
consequences of that difference for thinking consolation in particular and for 
augmenting our interpretive spectrum for narrative affect in general synchronizes my 
overarching motivations. Oxymoronic though it may sound, critical solace names one 
of literary description’s most animating possibilities; yet the term also denotes a 
species of consolation forever aware of its own intimacy with loss, illuminating the 
descriptive tactics with which novels piercingly catalogue the catastrophes they both 
register and reform. 4 A good deal of fiction’s poignancy, as readers well know, often 
stems from its moving apprehension of what ultimately cannot be repaired. But I 
argue that the more this pathos depends on the facility of its own depiction, the more 
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likely style is to metabolize sorrow with militant grace.5 Description in contemporary 
writing not only resets consolation’s aesthetic conditions of possibility but also alerts 
us to its critical potential – even though solace has usually served as the dodgy 
opponent of criticism wedded to the perceived virtues of disenchantment.  
  
Description as Defection 
 
If consolation has often been brought into disrepute – unfairly cast as a distractive, 
substitutive affect, one that supposedly blocks our recognition of systemic inequalities 
and deters us from dissident readings – then it’s not alone.6 For nothing seems more 
susceptible to ingrained assumptions than literary description. Surely the most durable 
is that terminological division of narration and description propounded by Georg 
Lukàcs. Despite “all its virtuosity,” he claims, “description is mere filler in the 
novel.”7 Zola happens to be the primary target here. But Lukàcs broadens his 
indictment beyond nineteenth-century naturalism to issue a warning about novelistic 
production at large, because in his view description had become “the writer’s 
substitute for the epic significance that has been lost” (“ND” 127). Clearly there was 
something “compensatory” about description for Lukàcs too, though here its 
substitutions carry a rather despondent ring. Above all, what worried him was “the 
danger of details becoming important in themselves”: with the consequent dilution of 
narration, these “details cease to be transmitters of concrete aspects of the action and 
attain significance independent of the action and of the lives of the characters” (“ND” 
132). If this sounds rather inflexible in theory, it’s even less viable in fictional 
practice, where we discover focalization turning characters into active participants of 
description, perpetually chronicling their own sensory perceptions. Far from 
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“transform[ing] people into conditions, into components of still lives,” as Lukàcs 
insists (“ND” 139), characters’ shifting inclinations carry depictive inflections, their 
mental states pilot the text between picturing and narrating, and their felt experiences 
precipitate the reader’s empathy or animus. All of which seems a far cry from 
fictional persons being objectified victims of static portraiture, complying with “a 
schematic narrowness in characterization” (“ND” 139).  
But however unhelpful Lukàcs’s distinction turns out to be, it stands at the 
head of a steady stream of mild antipathy toward description running across 
twentieth-century criticism, a stance that has persisted even when description’s 
connection to or detraction from narration isn’t really at stake. As Mieke Bal 
observes, description has become something of “a bone of contention” in its own 
right. One explanation for this, she suggests, lies in the “gap” dividing “a criticism 
that applauds description” from “a narrative theory that marginalizes it,” when 
analytical priorities split between paying attention to “the ‘experience’ of reading” 
and accounting more systematically for fiction’s “logic of structure.”8 There’s no 
reason, of course, why an emotional understanding of narrative procedures should be 
inimical to a pragmatic, taxonomical study of structural patterns, implying as it does a 
contradiction between affect and analysis that is just as misleading as the 
disconnection of “description” from “narration.” In a vigorous exposé of these 
needless binaries, Ruth Ronen points out that the description-narration polarity has 
“endured” largely because it has been tacitly reinstated by critics themselves, even 
though there is “considerable confusion caused by the difficulty in sustaining the 
opposition in practice.” Indeed, to uphold the dichotomy, one has to take for granted – 
just as Lukàcs took for granted the way description reduced characters to the 
equivalent of objects in still-life painting – that “the referentiality of description 
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counteracts” a novel’s “narrative syntax,” insofar as description “follows the logic of 
the object described rather than the narrative demands to which the object is 
subjected.” This premise has spurred “post-semiotic theorists,” as Ronen calls them, 
to “claim that description is everything which is negative of narrative (viewing 
narrative as a structure of signification while considering description as a mode of 
pure reference),” thus imposing “a theoretical opposition incompatible with textual 
experience.”9 And it’s this experiential element that concerns me here, as I account 
for fiction’s consoling affordances in description’s unexpected countercurrents of 
lexical, grammatical, and metrical energy. When style refuses to be subsumed in story 
it breeds dissent, causing friction between expression and the very actions we expect 
language not only to convey but also to complement – a friction that marks the point 
at which description defects, shirking its mimetic duties so as to reckon with what it 
shows.  
 That description can perform these ameliorations, however, raises ethically 
loaded questions about the responsibilities it has toward the affective or material 
damage writers detail. This is not an especially contemporary dilemma, of course.10 
To the extent that description really can mitigate upsetting or even traumatic scenes 
through the way its micro-components – even down to the smallest pulsations and 
cadences, as we’ve seen in The Road – not only modify but mismatch what’s evoked, 
it points to an age-old quandary of whether writers should embrace or resist the 
compensations of form. My aim here, however, is not to historicize that dilemma but 
to entertain the methodological assets of shifting attention from reception (where we 
usually go to speak about the consoling effects of literature) to expression (where 
solace may be reconceptualized in compositional terms). In particular, I submit that 
prominent writers from recent decades have themselves been taking on the work of 
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theorizing what solace means, often in the most unlikely genres and forbidding 
scenarios. Doing so their work reveals that consolation’s comportments frequently 
duck the noose of our expectations of what it might critically perform. Description 
makes a key contribution to this recalibration of solace even in works that, 
thematically speaking, contest the very premises of comfort or recovery. 
Conventionally seen as something rudimentary, functional, even dispensable, 
description’s limber moves could actually turn out to be among the most controversial 
aspects of what contemporary writing does. Setting description in tension with drama, 
the next part of this essay considers just how discrepant consolation becomes when 
depictions of dreadful loss put literature’s capacity for redress to the ultimate ethical 
test.    
 
Depicting and Overcoming 
 
That the provision of solace in fiction can be coterminous with sorrow sounds like the 
epitome of a performative contradiction. Yet the paradox is itself enabling, urging us 
to find ways of doing better justice to consolation’s formal variety without the 
presuming that we should also as readers feel somehow consoled. Narratives exercise 
consoling faculties most palpably, I argue, when they are most disquieting. And no 
late twentieth-century writer has chronicled the historical spectrum of that disquiet 
more disturbingly than the late W. G. Sebald. Looking to his work for solace might 
seem distinctly odd, renowned as Sebald is for charting the traumatizing 
consequences of imperial and military violence. His vertiginous reanimation of 
personal testimonies in solidarity with the victims of Nazi genocide carefully guards 
against the prospect of seeing consolation in webs of reconnection. For some 
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commentators, Sebald cannot quite “escape the seductions and consolations of 
systems” by substituting a “scholar’s preoccupations” for the “historical amnesia” he 
aims to rectify.11 But as Timothy Bewes has compellingly shown, Sebald deliberately 
exposes “the implied logic or explanatory thread” behind the very “principle” of 
patterning, ensuring the intellectual comforts of “connection” represent less an 
opportunity for “resolution” than the further “posing of a question.”12  
What’s more, Sebald’s own register complements this questioning of 
consolation, forestalling form’s easy recuperations. Restrained, sometimes aloof, the 
very timbre of his prose might appear too inhospitable for solace, especially when 
“moments of emotion tend to be rendered purely visually” in his texts, insofar as 
“emotion itself is never identified or characterized” but instead described.13 In sum, 
because Sebald “never offers” an “affirmative vision,” as Matthew Hart and Tania 
Lown-Hecht point out, it’s hard to know where in the “consistently melancholic tenor 
of his Weltanschauung” consolation’s countermelody might be heard.14 In what 
follows, though, I want to take up the gauntlet by considering how Sebald’s style – 
“characteristically cryptic and unemotional” though it often feels in translation – 
counterpoints episodes that are far from consoling.15 Bringing the resources of 
description to bear on the frequently unspeakable experiences he traces, Sebald 
complicates the notion that trauma is always indescribable, while nonetheless refusing 
– by way of his antique vocabulary and unruffled poise – to countenance the idea that 
style should ever alleviate readers of the traumatizing burden of what he describes.16 
 Throughout his career, of course, Sebald engaged the consequences of 
persecution whose victims can never be compensated. However unimaginable those 
atrocities are, description is all that remains. Reflecting on Jean Améry, Sebald 
maintains that for “those whose business is language, it is only in language that the 
 11 
unhappiness of exile can be overcome,”17 a conviction ratified by his earlier 
discussion of Austrian literature as well. There Sebald insists that the process of 
“rethinking of one’s relation to misfortune” can in fact be “a form of resistance.” And 
furthermore, “on the level of art as a whole,” he suggests that the emotive and stylistic 
“function” of representing this “relation” is “something other than simply to be 
reactive or reactionary.” In a situation where “melancholy, gazing rigidly, once again 
realizes that things could have only turned out the way they have, it shows that the 
origins of desolation [Trostlosigkeit, the opposite of Trost, consolation] and that of 
insight are governed by the same power. The description of misfortune includes 
within it the possibility of misfortune’s overcoming.”18 To evoke desolate events – 
whose terrible logic of inevitability seems only to be confirmed in hindsight – is the 
starting point, suggests Sebald, for accessing melancholy’s epistemology, for 
reclaiming “insight” from despair, so that describing adversity furnishes its own 
“form of resistance.” This modality of “overcoming” is not equal to forgetting or 
willful denial. Quite the opposite. By making the distresses of misfortune legible, 
description makes them vigorously immediate, tangible, unavoidable. And that, 
implies Sebald, is the critically consoling point of writing about what fundamentally 
cannot be redressed. Description dramatizes its own capacity, however insufficient, to 
bring damaged experience into close-up, in ways that intercept not only misfortune’s 
dissolution through retrospection but also the very foreclosure of its possible 
consolation. 
 What does writing look like that achieves this double-act, this simultaneous 
defiance of memory’s extinction and consolation’s exclusion? At least one model 
emerges in Sebald’s eloquent commentary on Améry, where he turns to the ethics of 
(self-)expression as alleviation. Admiring his “scrupulous restraint,” Sebald 
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acknowledges that for Améry language becomes the very “means whereby he 
counters the disturbance to his existential equilibrium” (“AI” 153, 162). This solace 
of self-articulation, however, “ultimately proves inadequate as a cure for the 
precarious condition of a man losing faith in the world again daily when, on getting 
up, he sees his Auschwitz number tattooed on his forearm.” Distinctions between the 
solace we might project upon writing as a potentially therapeutic activity and the 
disconsolation that the writing subject himself endures contain great pathos for 
Sebald: “The words that Améry set down on paper, and which seem to us full of the 
comfort of lucidity, to him merely outlined his own incurable malady” (“AI” 162). 
While this is an incisive warning against the overhasty celebration of literature’s 
consoling efficacy, the “comfort of lucidity” nonetheless weaves its way into Sebald’s 
own work, particularly in Austerlitz, his 2001 narrative that occupies my focus here. 
As we’ll shortly see, language’s provision for “existential equilibrium” in this text 
permeates Austerlitz’s unfurling self-descriptions, the exceptionally propulsive nature 
of which counters the disorientation and incapacity he recalls. If Austerlitz’s thematic 
preoccupations lodge in what Hart and Lown-Hecht call the “ineffability of individual 
experience” – focalized by a character who is “waiting to remember, waiting to 
belong, waiting to return to a place that is gone” – the book’s formal preoccupations 
are with redescribing such experience with a dexterity that consoles the physical and 
mental displacements Sebald narrates.19 
 An episodic, fractured biography of sorts, Austerlitz frames a series of 
conversations between its eponymous architectural historian and a distinctly self-
effacing narrator, beginning in Antwerp in the 1960s and resuming again decades 
later after the two men are reunited by chance. We learn that Austerlitz arrived in 
Britain as a refugee with the Kindertransport from Czechoslovakia, and that only after 
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the death of his Welsh foster parents did he start to learn about his family’s fate in 
Nazi-controlled Europe, including his mother’s eventual deportation to Theresienstadt 
concentration camp. If Austerlitz refracts histories of unimaginable atrocity through 
the familial losses of this singularly haunted, perpetually searching individual, it’s 
also a record of Sebald’s search for a prism capable of that refraction. This “prose 
book of an indeterminate kind,” as he preferred to call it,20 is at the same time a quest 
for the “requisite gravity of language” – in a phrase from Sebald’s Améry essay – a 
quest to “make the literary treatment of genocide more than a dutiful exercise marked 
by involuntary infelicities” (“AI” 146). Skirting this duty, Sebald’s writing confronts 
memory’s formidable returns and unforgiving absences, compensating for the voice 
Austerlitz himself struggles to give to the “bleak prospect” of history’s fluidity, with 
its “ever-lasting misery and never-ending anguish.”21     
“From the first,” reflects our narrator, “I was astonished by the way Austerlitz 
put his ideas together as he talked, forming perfectly balanced sentences out of 
whatever occurred to him, so to speak, and the way in which, in his mind, the passing 
on of his knowledge seemed to become a gradual approach to a kind of historical 
metaphysic, bringing remembered events back to life” (A 14). Austerlitz’s aptitude 
for “perfectly balanced sentences” in making surprising connections and “bringing 
remembered events back to life” sounds so commensurate with what Sebald called his 
“attempt at restitution” – something imaginative literature can do that other “forms of 
writing” cannot – that it’s hard not to see that description shades into ventriloquism 
here.22 Derailing though the process of partial remembrance and reconstruction often 
is for Austerlitz, his knack for historical resuscitation corresponds with his creator’s 
project in ways that seem more reciprocal than merely coincidental. And however 
much his odyssey appears to take over the narrative’s perspectival or tonal reins, 
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Austerlitz is closely trailed by a distinctly Sebaldian narrator-figure who adopts the 
ethical injunction “to maintain neutrality,” as Carol Jacobs puts it, suggesting that 
“oblique indirection” is as “necessary” as any “purposeful refusal of interpretation.”23 
Meticulously unimposing, this narrator cultivates fluency – a more explicit feature of 
the English translation, perhaps, than of the original German – something he manages 
to encourage in Austerlitz, too, as his attentive confidante. So while, in content, 
Austerlitz’s trains of association bear the stresses of traumatic reconstruction, then, in 
form, they also retain a compensating fluidity, capturing a sense of impetus amid 
Austerlitz’s periodic bewilderments.24 Determination underlies self-description in 
“bringing remembered events back to life;” but the velocity of these resuscitations 
coexists with our suspicion that Austerlitz’s sentences are “perfectly balanced” owing 
to the fact that they’re not merely recorded but also recast by his shadowing 
amanuensis. Consequently, a first-hand yet finessed portrait emerges of an individual 
who describes journeys and encounters with a decisiveness that overcomes the 
elusiveness of the past he’s trying to assimilate, a portrait that withstands – through its 
liquid manner of disclosure – the extent to which “the thread of chronological time,” 
in Sebald’s words, as for all “victims of persecution,” becomes increasingly “broken” 
(“AI” 150). 
Descriptions therefore accumulate in Austerlitz not only to provide and 
manage information for the reader. Nor do they simply enact the epistemic 
instabilities and emotional insecurities that accompany Austerlitz’s confrontation with 
the chimera of total recall. Description does much more than that; something more 
counteractive than the text’s voyages into overwhelming, indecipherable pasts would 
suggest. Austerlitz, to be sure, struggles toward self-expression, knowing that “the 
exposition of an idea by means of a certain stylistic facility” came to seem like 
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“nothing but an entirely arbitrary or deluded enterprise” (A 175). Yet therein lies the 
source of the text’s most vivid ruminations: descriptions of the difficulties that 
“exposition” presents defy Austerlitz’s incoherence in facing a history he has 
suppressed and whose recognition later threatens to spell a “silence of unfathomable 
profundity” (A 232). Sebald counters that silence by turning description, in effect, 
into narration. Fraught sequences of self-exposition not so much interrupt narrative as 
initiate it. In this fashion, the book becomes a scarcely interrupted testimony, even as 
we can also see how aptly the shimmering, indefinite edges of many episodes capture 
the way “certain moments,” for Austerlitz, “had no beginning or end,” such that “his 
whole life had sometimes seemed to him a blank point without duration” (A 165). If 
the narrative’s movement from one winding excursus to the next resembles such 
amorphous “moments,” this does nothing to alter its strangely resilient articulacy. 
Austerlitz’s expressivity survives the emotional vortex it conveys to mitigate that 
“deluded enterprise” of self-elucidation at its heart.  
 Oblivion stalks and threatens this fluency throughout, however, especially so 
in the narrator’s visit to Breendonk fort, near Mechelen, commandeered by the Nazis 
while occupying Belgium and turned into a notorious torture centre: 
 
Even now, when I try to remember them, when I look back at the crab-
like plan of Breendonk and read the words of the captions – Former 
Office, Printing Works, Huts, Jacques Ochs Hall, Solitary Confinement 
Cell, Mortuary, Relics Store and Museum – the darkness does not lift but 
becomes yet heavier as I think how little we can hold in mind, how every 
thing is constantly collapsing into oblivion with every extinguished life, 
how the world is, as it were, draining itself, in that the history of countless 
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places and objects which themselves have no power of memory is never 
heard, never described or passed on. (A 30–31) 
 
The run-on sentence (in Anthea Bell’s translation) captures in its overflow the 
illimitability of “countless” sufferings, with their futile appeal to be “described or 
passed on.” Aided by the expanding, gathering force of this parataxis, Sebald’s 
narrator extends the ambit of “oblivion” beyond his first-hand experience of 
Breendonk as a monument to atrocity, taking in “countless places and objects” in a 
wide embrace that reminds us – at this early moment in Austerlitz, as though priming 
us for the narrative to come – that Sebald’s overriding “concern,” as Ruth Franklin 
notes, is not always with “the actual events” of the Holocaust “so much as their 
aftereffects, which cascade down out of history into the lives of anyone touched even 
obliquely by war.”25 Records of this cascade are “constantly collapsing”; and yet, this 
menacing void, this seemingly inexorable dissolution of description, is Sebald’s 
incentive. Granted, the phrasing here – at once accretive yet volatile, a catalogue that 
succumbs to its own terrifyingly “countless” focus – simulates the insurmountable, 
forever redoubling task of writing micro-histories of those imprisoned, unconsoled, 
and forgotten, a task that would never be ethically sufficient for what it strives to 
render. But if there’s relatively “little we can hold in mind,” then there’s more we can 
potentially express in the written word: a promise that Sebald realizes with great 
virtuosity in Austerlitz, even as he draws attention to the inadequacies of his chosen 
form.  
Sebald is of course acutely aware of the moral implications of how literature 
transcribes damaged pasts, so much so that his register in translation maintains a kind 
of pristine reserve, an unwavering remoteness. Thus if Austerlitz’s narrator – attentive 
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listener and elegant scribe that he is – appears to compensate Austerlitz for the “total 
paralysis” of “linguistic faculties,” the prose that activates this compensation remains 
methodical, unostentatious, despite its occasionally antique flourishes. This promotion 
of modesty obeys Sebald’s stipulations about the limits of literary consolation: limits, 
in other words, that mark a definite ethical position on redress; limits beyond which 
he would risk aestheticizing the “sense of rejection and annihilation” that Austerlitz 
had “always suppressed” and that now breaches “the walls of its confinement” (A 
322). Yet even for a world-historical abomination as unrepresentable as the 
Holocaust, whose postwar legacies make the very principle of consolation seem 
unconscionable if not obscene; even where description is never suitably qualified to 
recover the experiences it embroiders; even here, suggests Sebald, there might be a 
role for literature to play as an agent of restitution, however incomplete or conflicted 
that role remains. Though Sebald seems well aware that “art alone is no substitute for 
memory,” there is still, as Franklin observes, “something deeply consoling about his 
vision of art as capable of offering some sort of recompense.”26 
Austerlitz eloquently maps the uncertainties that compel suffering individuals 
to ask whether “we know ourselves, how do we remember, and what is it we find in 
the end” (A 287). In drawing that map, Sebald notates emotional and epistemic 
consternation rather than simulating trauma through formal flamboyance. And yet this 
restraint contains a further paradox. While Austerlitz pretends neither to embody nor 
to appease the distress it shows, Sebald’s prose still lends exquisite design to ruptured 
recollection – a prose whose poise goes to prove how “trauma’s stalling,” as Roger 
Luckhurst remarks, often “actively provokes the production of narrative.”27 
Composed, tenacious, sometimes pedestrian: Sebald’s descriptions sail closer than he 
perhaps intended to that “traditional idea of creative writer,” in his words, “bringing 
 18 
order to the discrepancies in the wide field of reality by arranging them in his own 
version.”28 At the same time, such ordering and shaping are ultimately of a 
provisional, purposefully unnerving kind, comprising a style that seems forever 
watchful of what Sebald called the “comfort of language evoking pity.”29 
 
Styling Counterlives 
 
Pursuing further this sense that language confronts even as it amplifies pitiable events, 
I want to move now toward the end – with the help of an ending. The one I have in 
mind ranks among the most simultaneously moving and troubling scenes in 
contemporary fiction. More than a crucible of poignancy, though, it’s an episode that 
speaks to some metacritical concerns that have hovered in the wings of this essay and 
ought finally to take the spotlight. Specifically, the scene in question allows us to 
tarry with the mutual implication of narrative register and divided response, 
demonstrating how descriptions that stage consolation as a problematic also solicit a 
reading experience that leaves us conscious of the vocabulary we use to engage solace 
– caught as our experience is, I want to suggest, between compassion and critique. 
The finale comes from Never Let Me Go, Kazuo Ishiguro’s celebrated 2005 novel, 
whose counterfactual portrait of postwar England imagines a society from which that 
most fundamental focus of institutional care and consolation – personhood – has been 
reduced to a purely instrumental value. All but erased from public conscience, cloned 
humans provide harvestable organs, delaying the onset of most common fatal diseases 
by exponentially increasing life expectancy for the general (that is, non-cloned) 
population. Palliative nursing research has long emphasized the importance of 
patients’ “experience of an empathic relationship with their nurses,” an experience 
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best “captured in the category of ‘affirmation as a person’.” In grim opposition to 
nursing’s basic ethical codes, Ishiguro’s clones face the impossibility of ever being 
acknowledged as individuals at all – of ever being “affirmed” as persons with whom 
nurses can empathize.30 That the state has legislated this heinous voiding of care is of 
course the novel’s central abomination and core thematic preoccupation. Yet the 
perversion of care itself – including the costs borne by clones who take pride and 
comfort in caring for fellow donors destined to be killed by the societal profit they 
sustain – plays a crucial part in how the novel parleys with the plausibility of solace. 
Denied the very principle of positive carer-patient interaction foregrounded by recent 
scholarship on nursing practices, Ishiguro’s clones are denied too what Astrid 
Norberg, Monica Bergsten, and Berit Lundman call the assurance of “consolation as a 
spontaneous unselfish manifestation of life in an exclusive atmosphere of giving and 
receiving in mutual trust.”31  
Unless, that is, they get a carer like our heroine, Kathy H. Having decided to 
commit her remaining years to nursing clones – including her difficult, jealous friend, 
Ruth, along with the love of her life, Tommy – Kathy accompanies them on 
successive donations, affording them post-operative solace until the day comes when 
they “complete.” She’s adamant about maintaining care standards, regardless of the 
pointlessness that stalks the whole enterprise and that Tommy insinuates in a brief 
quarrel late in the novel, where he asks “‘is it really that important? Okay, it’s really 
nice to have a good carer. But in the end, is it really so important? The donors will all 
donate, just the same, and then they’ll complete.’” Buffering herself from the dread 
underscoring Tommy’s observation, Kathy insists: “‘Of course it’s important. A good 
carer makes a big difference to what a donor’s life’s actually like.’”32 Never losing 
sight of that possibility, Kathy has excelled at what she does. Having “developed a 
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kind of instinct around donors,” she intuitively seems to “know when to hang around 
and comfort them, when to leave them to themselves; when to listen to everything 
they have to say, and when just to shrug and tell them to snap out of it” (N 3). 
Knowing how to enable her patients to describe their feelings to themselves – while 
knowing too when to take up that description herself – is evidently part of the comfort 
she provides.  
Yet Kathy has her own reasons for description on a larger, self-excavating 
scale too. For the novel itself might be viewed one extended re-description, as she 
leads us back to childhood and the friendships forged there with Ruth and Tommy, 
who subsequently succumb to a life-determining system none of them can change. 
Moreover, Kathy’s retrospective story – what Mark Currie calls a narrative of 
“unwanted freedom and remembered anticipation” – pitiably gathers and groups 
shards of solace.33 Resembling a personal memoir both in mood and in its spatially 
confined purview, the novel compositionally enacts (perhaps desperately so, from our 
perspective) an extended consolation through self-descriptive reminiscence. A 
painstaking process of memorialization thus outweighs, by virtue of its sheer 
exhaustiveness, the more dreadfully finite prospect of Kathy’s time as a carer drawing 
to a close. Meticulous retrospection compensates in part for fateful apprehension.  
Memories will endure “safely in my head,” predicts Kathy; they constitute 
“something no one can take away,” now that she faces the prospect of an imminently 
(and, for the reader, ominously) “quieter life” she expects to lead after years of 
nursing a donor-community she will soon join (N 262). Through this “confessional” 
orientation toward the past as well as to what’s lies ahead, Kathy “positions her 
reader,” in Anne Whitehead’s terms, “as fellow victim and passive observer 
(preoccupied with the same minor compensations and injustices as herself),” so that 
 21 
consequently “by the end of the novel we too have become ‘carers’ through our 
involvement in and affective engagement with her story.”34 Picturing readers 
confronted with the predicament of looking “beyond the immediate needs of those 
who are closest to us,” Whitehead persuasively suggests that Never Let Me Go 
allegorizes the way “literature and care work” alike can “uphold social inequalities, 
by producing consoling (but false) fictions of legitimacy and meaning.” Such fictions 
operate as a “diversion from activist agendas,” typically “by enabling us to feel good 
about our actions without interrogating too closely the power structures and relations 
that underpin them.”35 In a moment I hope to offer a rather different account of where 
the reader might emotionally end up by the novel’s close. Avoiding the proclivity to 
yoke consolation together with collusion, I’ll suggest that Ishiguro invites us to 
contemplate the predicaments of our own complicity and, further, to contemplate the 
penetrative goals of interpretation as such. For now, though, it’s worth noting that 
feeling good with respect to one’s actions without entirely reflecting on our own self-
justifications is exactly what critique can sometimes be about. When criticism 
consecrates its own interrogative agendas, it may recycle exactly the sort of response 
that Ishiguro, I argue, wants us to scrutinize. He does so by compelling us to look 
again at how our will-to-expose “minor compensations” throughout the novel – 
whether in terms of the fictions clone-children seek refuge in, or the lonely routines of 
care Kathy now savours “later” in life – betrays the interpretive comforts afforded by 
demystification, including the comforts of proving the success of one’s own self-
assured apparatus.36 To the extent that a production of “consoling fictions” across the 
novel might actually be a mark of the clones’ imaginative autonomy – “the students’ 
true creativity,” after all, “lies in the narratives of possibility” which “they relate to 
themselves and each other”37 – Ishiguro calls to account, I suggest, the reader’s own 
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sceptical dismissal of such narratives of solace, speculative and arguably ineffectual 
(at least in this novel’s world) though they remain.  
Never Let Me Go’s provocation is therefore not only diegetic, centering on the 
milieu of bio-ethical atrocity and violent inequity that Ishiguro hypothesizes. It’s 
directed outward, too, aimed at a suspicious reader bent on associating solace with 
sentimentalism or self-delusion. A temporary patch in times of sorrow; an expedient 
sedative that blunts incentives to rebel; a mollifying gesture that invites us to 
acquiesce, to be content with what we’ve got: solace can be charged with all these 
misdemeanours. But Ishiguro mobilizes a different story about this most mercurial of 
affects, a story that’s also about exegetic method. Looming in his novel’s crosshairs is 
the critical appetite for verifying complicity, for indicting the reader who refuses 
automatically to condemn as a destructive fallacy what vulnerable characters utilize to 
console. That nothing could be more alluring for the critic than a self-satisfying 
critique of consolation’s supposed reinforcement of political passivity is the 
conundrum Ishiguro prompts us to deliberate. And it’s one that disposes me to look 
once more at what solace, beyond superficial compensation, might mean in the final 
scene of a novel that so potently mixes abiding dread with momentary comfort, a 
scene of transitory reprieve where consolation’s complexities are mediated by the 
work of description.  
In an interview from the mid 1990s, Ishiguro argued that “consolation” applies 
to “something you can’t fix or heal; all you can do is caress it.”38 For her part, Kathy 
leaves that caress till the close, regarding the temptation to spy a counterlife for 
Tommy and herself as an “indulgent thing” (N 263). Successive, often laborious 
phases of retrospection have until now waylaid her expression of the grief she has 
been trained to pre-empt. But in these last lines she yields:  
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That was the only time, as I stood there, looking at that strange rubbish, 
feeling the wind coming across those empty fields, that I started to 
imagine just a little fantasy thing, because this was Norfolk after all, and it 
was only a couple of weeks since I’d lost him. I was thinking about the 
rubbish, the flapping plastic in the branches, the shore-line of odd stuff 
caught along the fencing, and I half-closed my eyes and imagined this was 
the spot where everything I’d ever lost since my childhood has washed up, 
and I was now standing here in front of it, and if I waited long enough, a 
tiny figure would appear on the horizon across the field, and gradually get 
larger until I’d see it was Tommy, and he’d wave, maybe even call. The 
fantasy never got beyond that – I didn’t let it – and though the tears rolled 
down my face, I wasn’t sobbing or out of control. I just waited a bit, then 
turned back to the car, to drive off to wherever it was I was supposed to 
be. (N 263) 
 
“It’s a kind of consolation that the world isn’t quite the way you want it,” reflected 
Ishiguro in 1990, so that as a writer “you can somehow reorder it or try to come to 
terms with it by actually creating your own world and own version of it.”39 Echoing 
Sebald’s implication that, for the creative writers, it can be consoling to lend “order” 
to the “discrepancies” of reality by “arranging them” in one’s “own version,” Ishiguro 
is patently talking about the solace of imaginative liberty. Vestiges of this sentiment, 
though, can be spotted in the novel he published fifteen years later. It’s not that Kathy 
can or should simply “come to terms” with her world of premature loss. What’s 
moving instead is the self-consciousness with which she tests her own capacity to be 
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consoled, envisioning alternative outcomes in a private thought-experiment framed by 
her portentous expectation of having “to drive off to wherever it was [she] was 
supposed to be.” The reader is steered into a partial lee, tucked away from the squall 
of inevitability – knowing as we do that what awaits Kathy has only been deferred 
temporarily. And the elegance with which description escorts us into this gossamer 
refuge shows how style takes on a counterlife of its own. Looser syntax and sibilant-
rich diction transport Kathy’s language as she allows herself to be transported into 
this “little fantasy thing.” Tentatively submitting to a longing “only a couple of 
weeks” old, she breaks with hitherto laboured depictions of recalled events. 
Previously these have ensured small-scale reparations subdue her expectations of how 
lives might otherwise be, as her analysis of past experience funds a “therapeutic 
encounter,” in Bruce Robbins’s phrase, which “steals a good deal of the show.”40 
Here, by comparison, description relaxes: up to this point, it has been predominantly 
spare, declarative in construction; now it modulates into swelling parataxis, while 
Ishiguro liberates Kathy’s diction from the clichés of her foregoing recollections. 
Though she sets foot rather gingerly into this realm of gratifying speculation, 
accumulating conjunctions (in the passage’s second sentence) enable the paragraph to 
pick up lyrical momentum, just as we see the figure of Tommy in her mind’s eye 
“gradually getting larger.” If this precarious, perhaps recklessly soothing fantasy 
seems out of character for Kathy – someone who’s habituated to accept the fate she 
foresees – then that fantasy is all the more eerily affecting for the reader due to the 
stylistic and behavioural departure it represents.  
Inanimate, congregating rubbish might seem odd as a correlative for lives 
whose meaning this novel wants to regain. Yet the “shore-line” of gathering detritus 
befits in its everydayness the appalling vision of cloning as a normal component of a 
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proficient welfare state, one that invests in biological preservation at the expense of a 
second-tier population whose suffering seems masked from public view. “I wanted 
the characters in Never Let Me Go,” reflected Ishiguro, “to react to this horrible 
programme they seem to be subject to in much the way in which we accept the human 
condition, accept aging, and falling to bits, and dying.”41 However, his extended 
metaphor of the caught debris here flexes beyond this parabolic function, pointing to 
what this scene rhythmically and melodiously executes rather than what it 
allegorically signals. For these final lines create a sense of discursive uplift, whose 
pathos revolves around the prediction of consolation’s own brevity. The heightened 
register momentarily ambushes us before Kathy pliantly turns to go, snagging us 
alongside her, if only for “a bit” – like the litter indeed, but unlike the melancholic 
neglect that litter seems to symbolize. Description intervenes for an instant to impede 
the onset of Kathy’s abandonment once again to predetermination. 
Solace rarely materializes without a foretaste of its indeterminable cessation, 
and Ishiguro seems keen on finding the rhetorical means to acknowledge this. Hence 
the scene’s power resides not so much in what it fleetingly redeems as in the way it 
raises the stakes for the novel’s reader. By this late point, Ishiguro has primed us to 
expect, even to crave, style’s last-minute consolations, eager as we might be to detect 
some luminous counterpart to Kathy’s methodical, self-controlled recounting of lives 
that acquiesce to their own unspeakable biomedical consumption. What we first 
witnessed in The Road as that friction between style and situation returns; here, 
though, it also applies to the reader’s own sentiments. For this closing sequence 
dislodges our wishes, our concern, from the resigned self-consciousness that 
underscores Kathy’s description of it – animating though that description is when she 
permits herself, if only for a beat, to accept the fantasy’s solace. Ishiguro not only 
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exacerbates that friction between our response (whether compassionate or 
incredulous) and her apparent resignation, through the sudden commotion of language 
– in the crescendo of syntactic enlargement, euphonic elevation, and clausal flow – 
though he does do that too, of course, as the confluence of verbal grace and Kathy’s 
compliant self-inhibition attests. More pointedly, he also inflicts it on the very 
conditions of reading. By this I mean that traces of the self-awareness curbing 
Kathy’s consolatory vision carry over to her audience, cautious as we might feel 
about gleaning from her climactic lyricism a long-awaited balm for the sombre plot 
we’ve just experienced. Moreover, just as our response becomes haunted by the self-
control we witness in Kathy, the scene is backlit by the glow of all those affirmative 
readings one might be tempted to impose on it, however briefly and knowingly. For 
the temptation is this: when Kathy’s apprehension of consolation as an illusion 
coincides with our apprehensiveness about the gruesome destiny she’s now set to 
fulfil, her fragment of magical thinking entices us to feel temporarily consoled, not 
because we identify with Kathy’s situation at all but because we can sympathize with 
the hope of finding momentary solace against the odds – of recognizing when it can 
be more important to care about mental refuge than to critique its supposed fallacy.   
 Even if we’re content to indulge this temptation, Ishiguro provokes us in the 
end to oscillate between what we might call circumspect and consolatory readings. 
Yet that oscillation is by no means the novel’s takeaway message. For although his 
readers may be “caught” at the end “between staying and leaving, holding and letting 
go,” facing what Whitehead calls an “unresolved dilemma of care or empathy,”42 
Ishiguro also provokes us to consider the critical comforts such binaries offer – and to 
consider how they detract in turn from aspects of affective involvement which aren’t 
satisfactorily unravelled by recourse to the readymade glossaries of aporia. One of 
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those aspects relates to the way Ishiguro not only dramatizes our own desire for 
solace in the face of the sobriety with which Kathy entertains then dispels the 
consolation that coruscates through her glimpse of Tommy’s impossible return, but 
also reveals how that desire is enmeshed in, and emblematic of, larger predicaments 
of interpretation itself. Never Let Me Go, in short, embroils its reader in a way that 
questions our tendency to regard detachment and compassion, scepticism and 
complicity, critique and consolation as somehow irresolvable – along with the 
tendency too for finding interpretive succour in preserving antinomies as explanatory 
mechanisms. Ishiguro’s ambivalent ending reminds us that in “[f]oreswearing 
suspicion,” in Rita Felski’s phrase, we’re fruitfully “confronted not only with the text 
but with our implication and entanglement with that text.”43 If the novel teaches us 
something about what it feels to be an implicated reader it’s that it can be rewarding 
to admit – to probe, even perpetuate – our own complicities, in ways that help us to 
grasp unpredictable responses to literary affects. This is not to imply that consolation 
should be reduced to, and measured against, the idiosyncratic feelings of a given 
reader. Rather, it is to suggest that accounting for the dynamism of one’s very own 
complicity could be more important than the comfort-zone of critical distance for 
understanding what novelistic solace actually does.  
 
Consolation in Critical Practice 
 
Connoisseur of surface impressions; spokeswoman for what she notices (in patients, 
in friendships, in herself through hindsight), instead of what she suspects; defender of 
actions based around what she accepts, rather than what she unearths – Kathy is the 
paragon of a descriptive reader. With her at its perspectival helm, Never Let Me Go 
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urges us to reflect on the habits of “symptomatic reading,” namely, that a text’s “most 
significant truths,” as Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus put it, “are not immediately 
apprehensible and may be veiled or invisible.”44 Replacing these protocols, Best and 
Marcus have influentially outlined the rewards of “surface reading”: a method that 
comprises, among other things, a “willed, sustained proximity” to diction, tone, and 
other “apprehensible” (rather than covert) features of language (“SR” 10).  This has 
much in common with “reparative” criticism more generally, as well as with the aims 
of “weak theory,” since each of these approaches to some extent “stays local,” in 
Heather Love’s account, “gives up on hypervigilance for attentiveness.” As opposed 
to “powerful reductions,” this mode of reading “prefers acts of noticing, being 
affected, taking joy, and making whole.” With these priorities in mind, I agree with 
Love that critique often “misses the descriptive richness of weak theory.” 45  For while 
the story told here about solace in contemporary writing doesn’t consistently satisfy 
that theory’s criteria, whatever weight my readings have gained in pursuing 
counterintuitive or unexpected elements of description has in part been afforded by 
consolation’s own definitional “weaknesses”: its predisposition to historical 
generalization, despite its radical variability over time; its susceptibility to continued 
misrepresentation when viewed as a rather sketchy reason why literature matters 
thanks to the affective work it performs.  
To consider in description’s strategies the coalescence of calculated and 
unintended consequences can also be to contradict writers with whom we want to 
remain on intimate terms. Yet this is a risk worth taking. Getting up close with 
McCarthy, Sebald, and Ishiguro, I’ve given primacy to disruptive connotations and 
emotively inadvertent implications, and this seems quite distinct in both aspiration 
and outcome from the desire “to occupy” what Best and Marcus call a “space of 
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minimum critical agency,” where one feels eligible to conduct “literal readings that 
take texts at face value” (“SR” 17, 12). Moving rather nearer the vicinity of a “strong” 
rather than “surface” reading of description’s consolations enables us to embark on an 
equally strong reading of the conceptual potential of solace itself, and to gauge the 
advantages of thinking this affect through the complicated lives led by form. To that 
extent, I do share Best and Marcus’s inkling that to intensify our “attentiveness to the 
artwork” can spell “a kind of freedom” (“SR” 16), especially if that frees-up a more 
capacious sense of how writers ethically and stylistically debate consolation – fenced 
off as solace often is in critical discourse, owing to the dubious pacifications it 
allegedly kindles.  
Whichever way you look at it, consolation faces a pretty steep path to 
legitimacy. Explicitly negative experiences – trauma, shame, melancholy, despair – 
are of course consolation’s stormy bedfellows, but they’re usually cast as its noble 
antagonists; or, interpretively speaking, as essential counterparts immanently worthy 
of our critical time and energy. For unlike solace, these solemn, pernicious, often-
irreparable affects are dependably relevant, forever urgent, intrinsically venerable. 
Consolation, by contrast, is a rather more illicit citizen of literary studies; falling 
between two stools, it’s a positive affect that’s routinely prone to negative publicity. 
That consolation could in fact be as historically profound and profoundly enduring as 
suffering doesn’t really make up for its own shaky reputation, leaving solace hard-
pressed to promise critics the same gratifications afforded by topics with innate, 
unquestioned gravity. Yet this same struggle for analytical merit is precisely what 
makes the consolatory matrix of fiction so productively uncomfortable to work on, 
challenging our complacencies about which emotional occasions – and the cultural 
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works they inspire – deserve formal scrutiny, archival enrichment, and 
methodological innovation.  
We are used to seeing consolation as the aesthetic gift that any vigilant and 
conscientiously chary reader should refuse. But this obedient deprecation of solace 
runs the risk of becoming a self-satisfying convention in its own right. Presuming 
consensus over consolation’s suspect ploys is irresistibly gratifying: contemporary 
literature seems to know this, knowing too that it can do more than merely comfort us 
by confirming our own cherished doubts. For the writers considered here inspire 
counterarguments that don’t easily fulfil criticism’s regular forecasts about 
consolation’s detriments. As such they help us to observe that solace isn’t about 
recouping what’s left after loss, attenuating grief’s duration, or covering up the 
material causes of psychic devastation. Instead, a closer look at description as a 
conduit for affect allows us to conceive solace in active, unruly terms – a far more 
distant cousin of compensation than we might assume. By staging consolation’s own 
acknowledgement of incompletion, these writers disarticulate it from mere distraction, 
appeasement, and soothing repair. A phenomenon that resists the salve of exchange, 
that’s left open, that isn’t really concerned with the prospect of substitution, 
consolation glimmers in the elegant yet unsettling contours of contemporary literature 
whose discrepancies we can read more incisively by its light.  
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